In this essay I want to put forth the argument that
the issue of human free is peculiar to western philosophical thinking and how
it has been treated for over two thousand years. I also want to establish how
non-western thinking can offer important insight into the debate of ‘free will’
by offering a new perspective. To begin the philosophical discussion in this
essay I will introduce some colloquial problems associated with the area of
‘free will’ relatable to the reader, then go on to identify the formal
positions that have been taken up by western philosophy. After identifying
certain peculiar traits within the formal positions of western thinking about
“free will’ I will then draw upon a group of non-western thinkers namely
Aristotle, Epicurus and Buddha to demonstrate how new perspectives may help
philosophy escape out of old western problems associated with ‘free will. By
traversing the topics, debates and thinkers in this essay I hope to establish
new clarity and insight into the argument on ‘free will’ by respecting western
tradition and looking to new esoteric views to overcome limiting obstacles.
A
Colloquial Discussion of Free Will informed by Peter Van Inwagen
To begin with informally what is ‘free will’ and what
do we mean by it? Can it be won or lost? Is it earned or gifted to us by God?
Do animals or only humans have it? Does the lack of such a thing prevent us
from living our life in the way we want? And do we have the ability to change
our actions or choose between decisions? Such questions of a never-ending
multitude have puzzled human beings for thousands of years. ‘Free will’ in many
ways is a loaded term with lofty aspirations that aim to address why human
beings are free autonomous agents and how we act without coercion or force
coming from within or outside our bodies and mind. Also why is it the case that
when someone mentions ‘free will’ we seem to tie it to responsibility, if
someone acts badly or regrets a decision we sometimes say well you acted out of
your own free will ‘no one forced you to do what you did”. From the
colloquially position of ‘free will’ we can understand how western philosophy
is fundamentally interested in moral responsibility and how ‘free will’ can
connect agents to negative actions making them blameworthy. This leads to
discussions about possible alternative actions or worlds were ‘you could’ve
done otherwise’ if ‘free will’ exists, but does it? In order to answer such a question
we must examine ‘free will’ from a formal perspective.
In the western tradition Peter Van Inwagen offers
clear definitions on the ‘free will’ debate and the traditional position’s
associated with western thought;
“The free-will
thesis is the thesis that we are sometimes in the following position with
respect to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously have both the following
abilities: the ability to perform that act and the ability to refrain from
performing that act (This entails that we have been in the following position:
for something we did do, we were at some point prior to our doing it able to
refrain from doing it, able not to do it).
Determinism is the
thesis that the past and the laws of nature together determine, at every
moment, a unique future (The denial of determinism is indeterminism).
Compatibilism is
the thesis that determinism and the free-will thesis could both be true (And
incompatibilism is the denial of compatibilism).
Libertarianism is
the conjunction of the free-will thesis and incompatibilism (Libertarianism
thus entails indeterminism).” (Van Inwagen, 2008. pg 329-330)
From these definitions we can now analyse the formal
positions taken up by Western thinking. The ‘free will thesis’ defined above
outlines clearly how the ability to perform actions prior to doing them should
be open and malleable and how we should have been allowed to act in a way
opposite of what one choose to do after the fact. This is an important point
because “Determinism” as defined by Van Inwagen wants to maintain that the
‘past’ and ‘laws of nature’ prevent us from having the option to act in a
different way than which we chose to do. An example maybe someone who wants to
buy a drink and decides to purchase a Sprite instead of a Coke, from a determinist
perspective the agent could not have acted to the contrary, which seems a
stifling position to be put in. Thankfully ‘compatibilism’ is an intermediary
position between ‘free will’ and ‘determinism’ that argues that the former is
compatible with the later. Denoting that although our world is determined
agents still retain the power to exercise ‘free will’ so that if one really did
want to purchase one drink instead of the other this is taken into account and so
it would be determined that an agent explicitly purchase the drink so desired.
On the flipside incompatibilism is the position that ‘free will’ and
‘determinism’ are not compatible meaning that in order to exercise ‘free will’
the world must not be determined. Leading from such a position is the thought
that it is not enough to freely chose a drink that it is a determined action
that falls in unison with an agent's ‘free will’. Instead an undetermined level
playing field is demanded were an agent could’ve bought either the Sprite or
the Coke neither option being determined. Finally libertarianism is a position
on ‘free will’ that the ‘free will thesis’ is true and that no outside forces
dictate our actions making them incompatibilists. From the general terms of
Western thinking now defined we will now springboard off at this point to
identify peculiar traits associated with two of them.
Contemporary
Western Views of Free Will; Libertarianism and Compatibilism
What are some of the peculiarities the libertarian
view offers in light of western thinking? Robert Kane in his paper
Libertarianism introduces the idea of a ‘self-forming
action”. The concept meaning that we have the power to act in way that
allows us to construct our own character and free will in certain
circumstances. He offers an example of a woman who is faced with a serious
dilemma of either stopping to help someone in need or fly past them and take an
important business meeting. It is in such positions were we feel divided about
which action to take when confronted by a testing situation that Kane believes
‘self-forming actions’ can occur.
From a libertarian perspective Kane also wants to
establish a quality of ‘free will’ that affords human beings ‘ultimate responsibility’ for our
actions. He is uneasy with the idea that we may not be fundamentally
responsible for our actions a view libertarianism does not endorse. Hence, in
his paper Kane makes a clear distinction between ‘free actions’ and ‘free
will’. This is because he wants to establish how we are ultimately
responsible for ‘free will’ whilst not being so for ‘free actions’ or inherited
character traits that are brought about by deterministic factors. Kane argues
that ‘free will’ must come from no other area or thing outside ourselves. The
rationalizing human faculties through the very functions of neurons in the
brain open indeterministic possibilities
of which we are ‘ultimately responsible’. The scholar states of the woman
facing a ‘self-forming action’;
“Her overcoming
temptation is not coming from an external source as in the above cases, but is
coming from her own will, since she also deeply desires to do the opposite.
Imagine that two crossing (recurrent) neural networks are involved, each influencing
the other, and representing her conflicting motivations, (recurrent networks
being complex networks of interconnected neurons in the brain circulating
impulses in feedback loops...I would argue, in the present case, whichever one
is chosen. The neural pathway through which the woman succeeds in reaching a
choice threshold will have overcome the obstacle in the form of indeterministic
noise generated by the other pathway.” (Kane, 2009. pg 41)
From this brief overview of Libertarianism I believe
we have on the surface identified important peculiarities of the western from
Kane’s perspective being the notion of ‘self-forming actions’, ‘absolute
responsibility” and the division between ‘free action and free will”. The
libertarian account of ‘free will’ aims to avoid being dominated by a
determined conception of the world and establish a strong standard of ‘free
will’. In my evaluation I will take up points about the specific phrases listed
and weigh up whether we can indeed condone or endorse indeterministic possibilities like Kane.
In the next paper published by Harry G Frankfurt
titled Alternate possibilities and moral
responsibilities the scholar helps us understand the position of compatibilism and how it tries to
accommodate human free will. The central argument his paper offers is how 'alternate possibilities' arise for
agents who are free to act in different ways but within a determined world.
Harry sketches out a theory of free will allowing agents to be morally
responsible without alternative possibilities. Harry aims to persuade the
reader that our notion of free will is not eliminated by outward forces or coercion in a strict sense. Instead he argues
that intrinsically it is the nature and temperament of agents that determines
how free will functions and operates through an agent's decision making.
Frankfurt believes that western philosophy has taken for granted the truth
claim associated with "the principle
of alternative principles" that means if one is coerced into acting in
a specific way with no other options they are not morally responsible for their
actions, as they can not exercise their own free will. Frankfurt's aim is to
deny such a claim by conveying how;
"A person may
do something in circumstances that leave him no alternative to doing it without
these circumstances actually moving him or leading him to do it - without them
playing any role indeed, in bringing about that he does what he does
(sic)" (Frankfurt, 1969. pg 830)
To better convey Frankfurt’s account he introduces in
his paper three different individuals called Jones (pg 832-3). Jones the first
is a person who is steadfast and 'unreasonable' and decides that he will
undertake a risky mission. Jones 1 is then threatened with serious
repercussions if he doesn't undertake the mission. However due to his nature
the threat has no effect on Jones 1 as he was settled on doing the mission
regardless and had he not decided to undertake the mission he would not have
acted regardless of a threat. Jones 2 is the opposite of Jones 1 and more
susceptible to fear and intimidation accordingly no matter what decision he had
previously made once the threat is made aware to him he would act to prevent
the harmful repercussions coming to pass. It is important to note how Frankfurt
understands that Jones 2 is fundamentally coerced and not morally responsible
for his actions unable to exercise free will, whilst Jones 1 is the opposite,
uncoerced and responsible for his decision making. Where things become
philosophically peculiar is Jones 3 who is neither unreasonable or fearful, he
decides to undergo the mission of his own accord but when he is made aware of
the threat believes there was no way he wouldn't have acted in line with the
threat to avoid repercussions. The question then remains is Jones 3 being
coerced even though there is no change in his actions affecting his free will
or is he not, furthermore should we hold him morally responsible for his
actions even though he was only going to act one way. In light of the conundrum
Jones 3 presents how moral responsibility, coercion and the ability to act is
not alleviated by alternative possibilities associated with free will that aim
to deny determinism. For it remains;
"The case of
jones 3 at first glance may seem to combine coercion and moral responsibility,
and thus to provide a counterexample to the doctrine that coercion excuses. It
is not so certain that it does so however, because it is uncertain whether the
example offers a genuine instance of coercion" (Frankfurt, 1969. pg 833)
From the outline of compatibilism above and the
associated problems I hope to have identified how determinism may be compatible
with free will. This is demonstrated by Jones 3 who acts freely but can only do
so in one way. I also claim to have identified yet more important fundamental
terms of western thinking on the topic of free will being; "moral responsibility" and "the principle of alternative
possibilities" as well as the "context
of coercion". In the next section of this essay I will return to the
past to examine views or cashed out accounts of ‘free will’ from a non-western
point of view.
Aristotle
and Epicurus views on the topic of Free Will
In ancient Greece Aristotle did not explicitly deal
with the idea of a ‘free will’ and debate whether we could truly act freely as
in the western philosophical tradition. Instead he aimed at understanding how
we act from ‘reason, desire and
appetites’, for Aristotle the essential ability of human beings is to act
well not having the options to do otherwise (Shields, C.,2008). The reason for
his view is that he believed ‘reason’ (thinking about something in the right
way) formed the basic foundation of all our good actions. The problem being
that desires and appetites within us contradict our rational faculties causing
us to fail to act right. From what I understand his account of ‘the will’ can
be understood as ‘reason vs desire’. For instance when a person is faced with a
dire situation of saving a life or not reason will tell us how and why we
should save them. However selfish desires and ‘weakness of will” may overpower
reason so that our actions fail to act in line with our reasoned conclusion to
save a life. From this general understanding of Aristotle’s view of ‘free will’
I believe the roles of ‘reason and
desire’ affect our ability to exercise out autonomy as agents as we can
only act in certain ways. This is due to the character that we can construct
over time meaning that if we do not practice acting well guided by reason we
really only have one way of acting, badly. Let us dig a little deeper into
Aristotle’s account.
In the Nicomachean ethics ‘the philosopher’ identifies
the ‘incontinent person’ as someone
who knows the right way to act by reason and deliberation, but does not do so (Kraut,
R. 2001). On Aristotle’s account of
‘free will’ the failure of the incontinent person to act well in clear
opposition with reason demonstrates their inability to dictate their own
actions. Aristotle sees the ‘incontinent person’ as deficient due to their
‘weak will’ that is flippant in relation to reason. As a result Aristotle
conceptualizes an idea of ‘character’. He argues that overtime the way we act
becomes entrenched so if one acts well or badly enough we no longer need to
deliberate about actions. In a sense our ability to freely act becomes limited
as our character or general trend for action good or bad means that in split
decisions like saving a life we can only act in one way due to long term habit
formation. As a consequence it seems Aristotle’s concept of ‘character’ may
deny human beings ‘free will’ if we cannot reshape our mental identities that
inform our actions. However, Aristotle answers such a problem by drafting in
‘virtues’ of how and why to act as human beings e.g. courage, compassion,
honour and justice all act as guides which enable us to learn and re-develop
our characters. Secondly the ‘incontinent person’ also conveys how determined
factors namely how we are raised can affect our wills meaning that we do not
have the ability to act from reason as desires outside of our control form part
of our character very early in our lives. Hence, when we are faced with a
terrible situation we may not be able to act well and take up the right action
conveyed by the virtues, but this can be changed. As the incontinent person can
evolve into ‘the continent person’ that is guided by reason, although they may
still want to act on their desires. From our discussion of the ‘incontinent
person’ I believe we have discovered an important concept in Aristotle’s
inherent view on human free will’; ‘character’
and how it fundamentally affects our ability to act and deliberate on our
own actions. However, in order to
further our understanding of Aristotle’s position of ‘free will’ I would like
to assess the philosophy of contemporary readings of his view to avoid a miss
step and pre-mature conclusion.
In Michael Frede’s book “A Free Will” the modern scholar explains how Aristotle’s
conception of “Free Will” is based on a commitment to determinism with
exceptions;
“Aristotle’s view
of the world is such that the behaviour of things in the celestial spheres is
governed by strict regularity dictated by the nature of the things involved.
But once we come to the sublunary, grossly material sphere in which we live,
this regularity begins to give out.” (Frede, 2011. pg 28)
Frede argues that Aristotle believed the world was
ruled by natural laws that govern the universe in the forms of laws of physics,
biology and chemistry. While at the same time he also wanted to maintain the
agent’s ability to causally determine their actions. While the construction of
the celestial universe may be subjected to influences by forces out of our
control the ancient philosopher maintains human beings have the ability to
choose how their lives unfold. From this idea Frede identifies two positions
human beings can reside in either ‘willing
or choosing’ something to happen;
“Willing and
choosing are altogether different but that choosing is a very special form of
willing. One may will or want something which is unattainable…Choosing is
different. We can choose to do something only if, as Aristotle puts it, it is
up to us (eph’ hēmin), if it is in our hands” (Frede,
2011. pg 27)
The excerpt explains from Aristotle’s perspective how
one's childhood and the decisions and actions that stem from it can be altered,
allowing us to escape from being determined agents. One can will to have had a
better upbringing so that our character would be better-rounded and the actions
we take more in line with reason but this achieves nothing. It is only through
a special type of willing namely ‘choosing’ that we can overcome our habituated
traits of character and escape being determined individuals. By allowing human
beings to alter our character through choosing something namely the pursuit of
the virtues, possibly at odds with our upbringing we become free to exercise
our own ‘free will’ and achieve a life of happiness possibly denied to us at
birth, due to unfavourable circumstance. The role of being able to ‘choose’ instead of simply “willing’ due to living in only a ‘semi-determined universe’ are aspects
of Frede’s account that spread new light and depth on an Aristotelian
conception of ‘free will’. But is Aristotle justified in stating that humans
can be self-causing in such a world or does his account lack rigour.
The insightful essay by Helen Steward titled “Fresh Starts” clarifies Aristotle’s
account of ‘free will’ based on the concept of a ‘fresh start” meaning at a
certain point past events stop affecting future causes as they are yet to be
determined. Whereas ‘universal determinism’ goes back indefinitely and claims
that all events are based on past occurrences, fresh starts are points in time
that break with the past to allow an escape from one singular determined
physical reality. Steward believes that the ability for human beings, animals
and even inanimate objects to be able to carry out actions that have not yet
been determined in advance by forces or factors from past actions creates a
basis for agent causal libertarianism
her own theoretical position developed from Aristotle’s work. Steward argues
that agents retain the ability to exercise free will to an extent in a
determined world similar to Aristotle. Helen also does not want to completely
eliminate the concept of determinism. This is because she wants to avoid an indeterministic world where past events
would have absolutely no bearing on future ones. For a world with completely
random relations to past events and human actions would be a very confusing
place to live as no one would be able to understand what effect actions of
‘free will’ would have on the future. Instead Steward argues toward the view
that when, where and how something happens exactly is only determined once an
outcome is essentially unavoidable until then it remains open and fluid. While
on the other hand certain things are determined in advance such as being born a
human I must also die, what is still opened and undetermined is the manner in
which I die. Only through my own decisions and actions will how I die become
determined. From Steward’s account she argues toward compatibilism where both
‘free will’ and determinism co-exist. This is achieved by her championing of
the agent as able to act freely within certain limits a view I hold Aristotle
to endorse.
A second aspect of Steward’s account on ‘free will” is
her own poignant view of Newtonian physics on page five that she identifies as
a force that seeks to reduce all living things to mechanically determined objects,
including human beings. She identifies the hegemony of science as one of the
sources of why a philosophy of fresh starts has not been taken seriously
denying humanity the ability to exercise ‘free will’ without committing to a
compatibilist world;
“I think modern
philosophy has lost the capacity properly to understand and make imaginative
sense of the Aristotelian conception of a fresh start. It has lost this
capacity, broadly speaking, because of the seventeenth-century scientific
revolution. Newtonian science, and perhaps more particularly the mechanical
image of the universe which that science engendered, had no place for such
starting points. According to the idealizations Newton's theories encouraged us
to envisage, everything evolves seamlessly from preceding states according to
immutable laws, so that no point later than some dimly understood 'beginning'
of time can ever be sensibly regarded as the point at which something comes to
be settled.” (Steward, 2008. pg 5)
Stewards view is characterized by a sceptical critique
of fundamentalism; were all things in the universe are reduced to physics and
all physical phenomena can be explained by natural governing laws of physics.
The problem created by fundamentalism in Steward’s view is that it stands
diametrically opposed to a theory of ‘fresh starts’. She argues that a theory
of ‘fresh starts’ is built upon the belief that all things do not serve a
function or purpose in the universe and should not be reduced to one primordial
starting point of causation that physics endorses. Steward instead wants to
question the widespread success of science and physical laws that have reduced
physical phenomena and forces such as gravity, matter, acceleration into neatly
understandable formulas and scientific theories. She desires a strong radical
demarcation of objects that avoids ‘sentient beings’ being defined by the same
scientific laws of physics that fundamentalism proposes. Animal and human
interactions in Steward’s view are governed by naturalistic laws created by
‘fresh starts’ that are random and fluid to a certain point before they become
determined. From Stewards account I believe her opposition to fundamentalism is
important and her concept of ‘fresh starts’ a strong theory for how human ‘free
will’ operates. Next we will examine the thoughts of a humble and pleasure
seeking thinker.
In his paper “Epicureanism”
Thomas A. Blackson describes how “in the
philosophical tradition prior to Epicurus the concept of the free will is not
present” he directly refers to Plato and Aristotle not mentioning the issue
in this way (pg1-2). Thomas notes how Epicurus broke from the tradition of his
philosophical forebears by identifying the notion of ‘the free will’ meaning
our innate ability to choose what we want in life and the free ability to
pursue good ends outside of influences constricting our ability to act;
“In this
behaviour, human beings are not forced by anybody or anything. Rather, in such
cases, a human being somehow does what he does in virtue of something in his
“mind”. The concept of free will entered the ancient philosophical tradition in
an explanation of what this thing is” (Blackson,
Epicureanism, pg 4)
Epicurus philosophy argued that we should pursue what
is good and pleasurable in life and avoid what causes us pain and unhappiness.
Accordingly Epicurus turned away from classical metaphysics of his time employing
somewhat forgotten empirical measures to rediscover how the merits associated
with atomism could reinvigorated an account of human ‘free will’. However, due
to the loss of primary texts written by Epicurus, noted by Thomas, we must examine
the later philosopher Lucretius who explained Epicureanism in a surviving text.
Lucretius argued that atomism supported the notion of free will by calling into
account the ‘atomic swerve’ an
empirical anomaly of how atoms moved without any seeming outside cause that if
true established a break in a determined conception of the world; ‘if there is no atomic swerve to initiate
movement that can annul the decrees of destiny and prevent the existence of an
endless chain of causation what is the source of this free will’ (Blackson,
pg 9). By the very nature of atoms and their ability to swerve empirical backed
up by scientific calculations Epicurus built a foundation for human ‘free
will’. For Lucretius as he put it argued that we were not living in a
completely determined world because atoms managed to split from past causal
chains through self-causation;
“In the case of an
atom, for example, when it moves without an external antecedent cause, the
cause of the motion is internal, in the nature of the atom (XI.25; LS 20 E 6).
Similarly, for the “voluntary movements” of the mind, it is acceptable to say
that there is no cause because there is no external antecedent cause. But it
does not follow that there is no cause of these movements” (Blackson, Epicureanism,
pg 10)
Following from Lucretius since human beings mimic
atoms by sometimes acting without any observable form of outside coercion or
force it follows that human beings retain the ability to self-determine their
lives via ‘free will’ like atoms. Furthermore, Epicurus argued that even if the
world was primarily determined and ordered in much the same way that atoms are
generally uniform and unchanging the ‘atomic swerve’ opened the door to human
‘free will’ in a compatibilist sense;
“The ordinary idea
that some human behaviour consists in things that human beings themselves do,
as opposed to things they are made to do by fate or by the gods. So, in this
case at least, there is no reason to think that Epicurus possessed a
substantive concept of free will”. (Blackson, pg 8)
From Epicurus account of ‘free will’ presented by
Blackson and Lucretius I argue that the most influential idea of such a theory
is the action of the ‘swerving atom’.
That acts as a buttress supporting Steward’s account of ‘fresh starts’
unequivocally. Leaving behind the ancient thinkers of Athens I will now turn to
examine eastern theories on the topic of ‘free will’. After the next section I
will offer an evaluation of all the accounts I have mentioned and their specific
core ideas and terms.
A
Buddhist Reading of Free Will
The Buddhist
conception of free will offers insight into the problem dealt with by the
western philosophical tradition. Free from Christian hang ups and societal
conditioning the eastern religion deals with ‘free will’ in a novel and
interesting way. In order to understand the multiple positions that Buddhist
philosophy takes on ‘free will’ I think the best place to start is with the
Buddha himself. The Stanford
encyclopaedia identifies the person we associate with being the first
recorded Buddha as Gautama born in Nepal living in around 560 BCE. A person of royal heritage he forsook a life
of wealth and pleasure to take up an existential journey to escape human
suffering and pain. In order to achieve enlightenment Gautama distanced himself
from local religions;
“Finding their
teachings unsatisfactory, he struck out on his own, and through a combination
of insight and meditational practice attained the state of enlightenment
(bodhi) which is said to represent the cessation of all further suffering”
(Stanford, Siderits, M. 2011)
How Buddha achieved enlightenment brings into the
light one of the main factors that contributes to our discussion of ‘free
will’. He believed that we suffered in life due to “impermanence and non-self... leading, over the course of normal
interactions with the environment, to appropriation (the identification of
certain elements as ‘I’ and ‘mine’)” why this is important to the western
understanding of the ‘free will’ is because the whole premise of the problem is
based on an agent that takes up the appropriated identification of “I” an
autonomous independent self-determining individual (Siderits, 2011). For
instance one may mentally think “I choose to go home instead of attending the
event/ I of my own account decided not to help when I could’ve as a result I am
free to dictate my own actions” on a prima-facie basis it seems there is a
strong case for a self-evident understanding of ‘free will’ built on a
foundation of the “I”. The western tradition then capitalizes on the concept of
the agent and self clarifying the position of ‘free will’ by testing it against
metaphysical grounds that may prevent the agent from identifying how their way
of thinking about their actions is in fact wrong. Ideas such as determinism and
how past casual chains could possibly seek to deny an agent's ‘free will’ must
be mulled over and debated in western philosophical text obscuring the truth of
agency under a Buddhist account. Buddha seeks to deny the identification of the
agent or “I” and is fundamentally against how normal human beings think about
their ability to act freely. He believed one’s individual ability to act was
partly an illusion that caused suffering and prevented us from achieving spiritual
enlightenment. As a result the “I” is firmly denied by Buddhism and in doing so
the concept of ‘free will’ is made redundant in a sense because no agent exists
to exercise it. From Buddha’s perspective the notion of western ‘free will’ is
like worrying about something not having autonomy that doesn’t exist.
Although Gaumata was the first historical Buddha this
does not make his position on ‘free will’ an exhaustive or all-encompassing
account within Buddhism. In order to get a richer and more nuanced account of a
Buddhist take on ‘free will’ we will now examine; Free Persons, Empty Selves: Freedom and Agency in Light of the Two
Truths written by Karin Meyers. The philosophers view offers a modern
examination of Buddhism on “Free Will” and expands upon the view of Buddha and
his view that lacks agents;
“One might object that given the
doctrine of non-self (anātman),
which explicitly denies that actions
originate from an agent
(kartṛ), Buddhists ought not be
bothered by the doubt that our
actions may not be up to us.”
(Meyers, 2014. pg2)
However, the crucial touchstone of the Buddhist belief
system is that one can self-determine our acts in a way that leads us from a
life of suffering to joy. Hence the very real problem that Myers identifies is
that Buddhism in a fallacious sense wants to eliminate agents to reduce
suffering through non-self yet for agents to also remain self-determining with
a sense of ‘free will’ that denies determinism so everyone can self-improve;
“There appears to be a contradiction between
the notion that
we enjoy free will, that we have some
degree of choice or
control over our actions, and the
doctrine of non-self, which
denies that actions are caused by
agents.” (Meyers, 2014. pg3)
Myers argues that Buddhism becomes a multi layered
doctrine were we should maintain the incorrect assumption of an “I” and believe
we act as individuals and then at a certain level decide we are wrong about
agent causation which seems counter-intuitive. Why should one choose a road
that is wrong and then at a certain point abandon it to reach the final
destination. The endorsement of a false sense of ‘free will’ as an agent is
needed and then must be dissolved to reach a higher state of being. A
caterpillar seems to mimic this philosophical set up in a sense by becoming a
cocoon the caterpillar is the antithesis of a butterfly but by only going down
a seemingly dead end being the cocoon is the only way it can cast off the life
of the caterpillar and emerge the transcendent butterfly. Perhaps Buddha’s
argument does hold water in light of the butterfly evolves and travels a dead
end to achieve far greater joy than is possible as a lowly caterpillar. What is
for certain is that Meyers identifies contradictory aspects of Buddhism between
the role of enlightenment and theories of the non-self that seem to shut down
discussions of agent based ‘free will’ prematurely.
Evaluation
- A Duel of Two Opposing Views
To evaluate both western and non-western views on the
topic of “free will” I want to examine the core arguments of each account and
see which group achieves a stronger position after my critique has occurred. The
‘western or non-western’ perspective that amasses the most victories against
the accounts of the opposition may claim to have established a stronger
position philosophically within the framework of my essay.
Firstly what should we make of Aristotle’s account
against Kane’s? The later wants to establish grounds for the basis of ultimate responsibility by allowing the
agent to have undetermined actions. Kane strongly denies the existence of
determinism as it eliminates indeterministic deliberations to be able to occur
where an agent could have acted in one of two ways. For Kane the ability of an
agent to act either way in the future constructs his idea of ‘free will’. So
how does Aristotle’s account answer such a position by Kane? Well from the
ancient thinkers view I argue that determinism does not deal a death blow to
Aristotelian human ‘free will’. Unlike Kane, Aristotle is happy with our actions
only being able to occur in one way limiting our ability to otherwise because
of determinism. This is supported by Hannah Steward’s account were things are
more or less open in how an agent experiences the world were we act and make
decisions. However, where Aristotle breaks from Kane and claims the later runs
into error his insistence on living in a world were two conceptions must be
able to come to pass. Implicitly in Kane’s view is the ‘alternative possibilities”
thesis which I simply do not find convincing. I agree with Aristotle that only
one conception of reality is demanded for the standard of ‘free will’ to exist.
But to offer a rebuttal to Kane’s perspective can Aristotle present a case that
allows human beings to take ultimate
responsibility for their actions if they can only act on way. This critique
offered by Kane I believe can easily be answered by Aristotle calling upon his
notion of human ‘character’. By being able to reshape our character and the way
we react to certain situations I claim under Aristotle we can achieve ‘ultimate
responsibility’ for human actions. For instance a person realizes that he must
look after a pet animal and in his care it dies, due to his state of character
at which he time was defective of virtue. The caregiver of the animal could
only act in line with appetites and desires that lead to the fatality of the
animal. He could only act in one way opposing reason and it was due to his
prior decisions and deliberations that the animal died. However, Kane may
answer on the contrary that we should not claim responsibility for every aspect
of our character and if this is so we are not truly responsible for the death. For
under Kane even though the agent acted poorly and the animal died our bad
actions were due to factors outside our control that affected our ability to
save the life. To this objection I also find fault, because within Aristotle’s
account there is a notion of being able to improve one’s character so that we
can turn from the ‘incontinent person’ into the ‘continent person’. We may
early in our lives accept that perhaps a very bad upbringing has shaped our
character in a way that we are guided by our appetites. However, at a certain
point we must also acknowledge that the past does not purely determine the
future. Seen in Steward’s contemporary reading of Aristotle ‘fresh starts’ that
allows us to break free from past baggage that has negatively impacted our
character. Due to this aspect it is within the grasp of us all to improve our
actions and state of character. Hence when we are placed in charge of an animal
that dies we can not blame it on outside forces that fashion us but our lack of
inner will to improve ourselves, which alone we are ultimately responsible for. Following from this point I rule in
favour of Aristotle’s non-western perspective out manoeuvring Kane’s
traditional western account of “Free Will”.
The second critique will take place between Buddha and
Peter Van Inwagen. At the outset Van Inwagen offers us a clear definition of western
philosophies problem of ‘free will’. His argument summarized is as follows; we
are able to do certain things before we do them consequently we have the
ability to do or not do such things (p329). The reason we do such things is
related to a specific agents own ‘free will’ that allows one to act the way we
want. I now want to offer a critique of how Buddha would rebut such a statement.
I imagine Buddha would claim that the ‘free will’ argument offered is a form of
mental ‘grasping’ of the mind that creates pain and suffering for human beings.
Whether it is wrong or right is important but what is more significant is how
instilled in the ‘free will’ problem is the need to hold onto things in the world
and re-inforce the western escape from ‘the non-self’. For Buddha there are no
agents that can exercise free will, this is because all agents are inherently
connected and are not autonomous in the way individualized western thinking
argues. What follows from Buddha dissolving the autonomous ‘I’ of the agent is
the idea that agents can no longer do one thing or the other before an action
takes place. This is because human beings in the vast majority have not yet realized
the true nature of our own individual mental construction of the world seen
through the “I” is illusory. From a Buddhist account I propose to have ‘free
will’ is not only the ability to act well, to do or not to do, improve one’s
life or character but also detaching from objects that one emotionally invests
in including ideas. Unlike Western thought ‘free will’ under Buddhism in my
mind is strikingly close to enlightenment a state of being where it is the
motivation and intentions behind actions that avoid suffering that substantiate
whether ‘free will ‘occurs. But could Van Inwagen counter by arguing that
enlightenment as a form of free will void of the agent is still impossible
under Buddhism’s account if the world is deterministic. By changing tact I
believe Van Inwagen is putting forth a strong rebuttal based on the problem of
‘fatalism’. Founded by Makkhali Gosala
a contemporary religious leader of Buddha (Siderits,2011) he argued that
fatalism meant all suffering was predetermined by karma and that human beings
are completely powerless to try and change our fate. Those who gain or achieve
a state close to enlightenment exercising ‘free will’ do so on a pre-determined
state. Meaning that almost all of us are never allowed to achieve ‘free will’
as only a handful become enlightened. The negative position of ‘fatalism’ is
abhorrent and denied by Buddha stating that are fates are malleable and we can
avoid suffering by choosing to avoid objects and commitment that cause one to
hurt. However, with Buddha demanding that there is no ‘I’ it seems wrong for us
to assume that we can change our fates if we are not really freely able to
choose one thing over another. To admit that we could choose one thing or
another before we have done so only seeks to validate Van Inwagen’s original
definition of ‘free will. And due to this circularity within Buddha’s account I
side with the western perspective for this argument.
The final round and decider of the dominant view falls
between Harry Frankfurt and Epicurus. Frankfurt wants to uphold certain qualities
of ‘free will’ that are fundamental to a western account namely; moral
responsibility and how the context of coercion and determinism do not radical
impact on human freedom. He believes that ‘free will’ can function unhindered
by a lack of alternative possibilities, a similar view to Aristotle’s. Epicurus
account in contrast does not want to yield to a purely deterministic world.
This is because he upholds the ability of the atom to break from causal chains
as a metaphorical foundation for human ‘free will’. He also wants to avoid any
form of coercion placed on the agent and its ability to act in certain ways as
the ability to exercise ‘free will’ should be unrestrained. But does Epicurus
account open the door to indeterministic problems that ruin the concept of
‘free will’. On a certain level it seems uncertain that if the atom can break
from the past and humans too based on such assumption then why not everything else
in the known universe that is made up atoms. If we deny Epicurus second claim
that things are generally determined with certain breaks that allow the future
to be undetermined could we posit the idea that breaks in casual chains may be
constantly occurring undermining causality. Leading to the problem that we
shouldn’t be sure a certain action or cause will lead to a predictable outcome.
From this critique Epicurus positions seems to afford ‘free will’ too much
freedom. On the other hand what should we make from Frankfurt’s position that
‘free will’ is compatible with coercion and the ability to only do one action?
Is a concrete ability to perform either this or that something we should really
sacrifice by dis-regarding the ‘alternative possibilities’ thesis? I dis-agree
and deny Frankfurt’s claim as feel that one should not be held ultimately responsible
in such cases were even the option to do otherwise is hollow like in the case
of Jones 3. Therefore I choose to take a risk and side with Epicurus who avoids
such deterministic positions that Frankfurt argues are not detrimental to ‘free
will’, to which I dis-agree.
Conclusion
To briefly summarize we have taken and extensive and
exotic look at both western and non-western views on ‘free will’. From
Aristotle to Buddhism, Epicurus to Frankfurt Steward and Kane all have
contributed to a fruitful discussion and debate on the strengths and weakness
of the views surveyed. Though the non-western view triumphed in the evaluation
the contest was very close and clearly conveys the strengths of both readings
of ‘free will’. I hope that my essay has introduced you to the virtues of
historical and eastern views that are not discussed so openly in western
debates. While at the same time the strength of contemporary theorists from the
western school of thought have shown why they demand great adulation and respect.
Perhaps the area of ‘free will’ will neither be settled permanently but in the
rising of the dust cloud and the shaking of the foundations old and new alike
innovation and discovery awaits for how we understand how human action operates
and whether it is guided by our own ‘free wills’.
Bibliography:
1)
Van Inwagen,P., ‘How to think about the
problem of freewill’, Journal of Ethics, 12(2008), 327-341.
2)
Frankfurt, H., ‘Alternate Possibilities
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Kane, R., ‘Libertarianism’,
Philosophical Studies, 2009, 144, pp. 35-44.
4)
Steward, H., ‘Fresh Starts’,
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